## MICHELLE LEBLANC-SHIELDS

v.

## TRESSA L. MEYER et al.

Submitted on Briefs February 20, 2019 Decided March 19, 2019

Panel: ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

## MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Michelle Leblanc-Shields appeals from the District Court's (Farmington, *Dow, J.*) dismissal of her de facto parenthood petition for lack of standing. *See* 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(2) (2018). Contrary to Leblanc-Shields's contentions, the court did not err in determining that she lacked standing to proceed with her de facto parenthood petition, nor did it err or abuse its discretion in denying her request for a hearing and her motion for further findings of fact. *See* 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(2), (3) (2018); M.R. Civ. P. 52(a); *Lamkin v. Lamkin*, 2018 ME 76, ¶¶ 10, 13, 186 A.3d 1276; *Davis v. McGuire*, 2018 ME 72, ¶¶ 13-28, 32, 186 A.3d 837; *Dalton v. Dalton*, 2014 ME 108, ¶ 21, 99 A.3d 723. Leblanc-Shields failed to present prima facie evidence of at least one of the requirements for de facto parenthood status; specifically, she failed to present any evidence that the biological parents "have understood, acknowledged or accepted that [a bonded and dependent relationship has been established between her and the child] or behaved as though [she] is a parent of the child," and therefore, as a matter of law, she does not have standing to pursue

her de facto parenthood petition.<sup>1</sup> See 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(3)(C); Philbrook v. Theriault, 2008 ME 152,  $\P\P$  23, 26, 957 A.2d 74.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

Ashley T. Perry, Esq., Sanders & Hanstein, P.A., Farmington, for appellant Michelle Leblanc-Shields

Meridith Lord, Esq., Maine Family Legal, LLC, Lisbon, for appellee Ryan Greenman

Bradley P. Sica, Jr., Esq., Law Office of Bradley P. Sica, Jr., PLLC, Canton, for appellee Tressa Meyer

Farmington District Court docket number FM-2018-63 For Clerk Reference Only

 $<sup>^1</sup>$  We reach this holding even though the District Court's conclusion was premised, at least in part, on Leblanc-Shields's failure to meet a different standing requirement of de facto parenthood. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(3)(A) (2018); Davis v. McGuire, 2018 ME 72,  $\P$  32 n.13, 186 A.3d 837.